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NELSON V NELSON A PROPOSAL FOR
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
I. INTRODUCTION: THE STATUS OF THE PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
IN MARITAL DISSOLUTION IN ALASKA
Is a professional degree or license, earned by one party during a
marriage, to be considered marital property subject to division upon
marital dissolution? The Supreme Court of Alaska has joined the
growing number of jurisdictions that have addressed this question,
holding in Nelson v. Nelson I that a professional degree or license is not
marital property. Under this holding, the spouse in Alaska who con-
tributes to her2 husband's professional education, and thus his earning
potential, cannot be directly compensated for her investment. The
contributing spouse must rely on the court's discretion in granting ali-
mony,3 if the court finds such an award both "just and necessary," 4 or
in considering her contributions when distributing the general marital
property. 5
On Nelson's facts, the court's refusal to recognize the professional
degree as property did not prevent an equitable result, but in other
factual situations the holding threatens to have that effect unless it is
modified. The court compensated the wife in Nelson by awarding her
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1. 736 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1987).
2. The contributing spouse is assumed to be the wife, because in the vast major-
ity of cases on record this is the situation. Exceptions include Lyons v. Lyons, 403
Mass. 1003, 526 N.E.2d 1063 (1988); McGowan v. McGowan, 142 A.D.2d 355, 535
N.Y.S.2d 990 (1988); Freyer v. Freyer, 138 Misc. 2d 158, 524 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1987);
Cronin v. Cronin, 131 Misc. 2d 879, 502 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1986).
3. The terms "alimony" and "maintenance" are used interchangeably in this
article.
4. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a) (Supp. 1988). The statute provides in pertinent
part:
In a judgment in an action for divorce.., the court may provide ... (2) for
the recovery by one party from the other of an amount of money for mainte-
nance, in gross or in installments, as may be just and necessary without re-
gard to which of the parties is in fault ....
5. Nelson, 736 P.2d at 1147.
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half of the substantial assets the couple had accumulated during their
seventeen-year marriage, pointing out that in the case of a long mar-
riage the wife "receives a return which may exceed the amount of her
contributions to [her husband's] education," and that the wife can re-
ceive a "return of her investment" by sharing in the accumulated mar-
ital property.6 The Nelson court was thus able to compensate the wife
without dealing with the ramifications of the professional-degree-as-
property issue.7
The court, however, expressly reserved the question of whether a
remedy exists to compensate the contributing spouse in the more com-
mon situation of a brief marriage during which one spouse has worked
to enable the other to study full-time, with the result that the couple
has not acquired any substantial assets that can be divided upon di-
vorce. 8 In such a case, the wife's situation upon dissolution is made
more inequitable by the possibility that, because she is obviously self-
supporting, the court will not find an award of maintenance "neces-
sary." Moreover, since in Alaska marital dissolutions are accom-
plished without regard to fault,9 the contributing spouse who may be
the more innocent of the parties can no longer make financial claims
on the basis of fault.10 Thus, the contributing spouse may leave the
marriage with nothing, while her husband takes with him the valuable
asset of future earning potential as a professional.
Alaska's courts will eventually be called upon to address the man-
ifest inequity in such a situation. The policy behind Alaska's statute is
clear: the court is to make every effort to balance the equities between
the parties." To broadly assert, as the court did in Nelson, that a
6. Id. at 1146 (quoting Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 158, 452 N.Y.S.2d
935, 939 (1982)).
7. In cases of long-term marriages, courts in other jurisdictions have taken a
facts-first approach similar to the approach used in Nelson, avoiding meaningful con-
frontation with the issue of how a remedy would be found in a different factual situa-
tion. See Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981); In re
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1979),
overruled on other grounds, In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166
Cal. Rptr. 853 ('1979); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct.
App. 1969); Vaclav v. Vaclav, 96 Mich. App. 584, 293 N.W.2d 613 (1980); Diment v.
Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
8. Nelson, 736 P.2d at 1147. In Rhodes v. Rhodes, 754 P.2d 1333 (Alaska 1988),
the supreme court held that the fact that the work of one spouse has contributed to the
earning potential of the other must be considered as a "relevant factor" in making an
equitable division of property. 754 P.2d at 1335. In Rhodes, as in Nelson, there were
marital assets that could be divided. The court still has made no provision for com-
pensating the contributing spouse in an assetless marriage where the contributing
spouse can be considered as self-supporting.
9. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a) (Supp. 1988).
10. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(2), (4) (Supp. 1988).
11. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a) (Supp. 1988). The statute provides:
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professional degree is not property subject to equitable distribution,
without making other provision for the contributing spouse where the
degree is the family's only asset, is to permit one party to leave the
marriage enriched at the expense of the other - a signal that further
balancing needs to be done.
Ideally, the Alaska Supreme Court should effect this balancing by
recognizing the professional degree as marital property and by valuing
it according to a labor theory of value.12 Alternative workable reme-
dies exist, however, that do not necessitate designating the degree as
property, and which are possible under Alaska law. These remedies
include equitable relief by means of quasi-contract and in gross restitu-
tionary maintenance awards. As long as Nelson controls, the courts
should consider applying these remedies when the situation envisioned
in, but not addressed by, Nelson arises.
II. NELSON v NELSON
June and Clairborne Nelson were married for seventeen years
prior to their divorce in 1985. June had worked full-time to enable
Clairborne to finish the last two years of his bachelor's degree in busi-
ness accounting. While he was in school, Clairborne also worked part-
time and received tuition aid because of his earlier military service.
After graduation, Clairborne went to work for ARCO and June cared
for their three children. She worked outside the home from time to
time as well, most recently as a part-time pilot for a local airline.13
The couple had accumulated assets valued by the trial court at
$196,343. June petitioned the court to declare her husband's degree a
"human capital asset" and thus part of the marital property, and to
compensate her contribution to that degree by adding a portion of its
value to her half of the property division.14 The Alaska Supreme
Court held that the lower court had not erred in dividing the marital
assets equally,1 5 or in failing to consider the degree as a marital asset.1 6
In a judgment in an action for divorce.., the court may provide (4) for the
division between the parties of their property, whether joint or separate, ac-
quired only during coverture, in the manner as may be just, and without
regard to which of the parties is in fault; however, the court, in making the
division, may invade the property of either spouse acquired before marriage
when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it; and to ac-
complish this end the judgment may require that one or both of the parties
assign, deliver, or convey any of their real or personal property to the other
party ....
Id. (emphasis added).
12. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
13. Nelson, 736 P.2d at 1146.
14. Id. at 1145-46.
15. Id. at 1147.
16. Id. at 1146.
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The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions have recognized
that one spouse has "a compensable property interest in the enhanced
earning potential arising out of the other spouse's degree.' 7 The
court, however, distinguished Nelson on the basis of the facts typically
present in such cases and absent in Nelson: the relatively brief mar-
riage during which no immediately available assets exist because one
spouse has worked to enable the other to obtain a professional educa-
tion. The court pointed out that Clairborne's degree was not a special-
ized postgraduate degree, that he had contributed as well by working
and receiving tuition aid, and that the length of the Nelsons' marriage
had allowed June to realize her expectations by participating in the
fruits of her husband's enhanced earning potential.', On these facts,
the court found that an equal division of the general marital assets by
the trial court was not inequitable.' 9 Moreover, the court declared
that a professional degree is not marital property subject to division
under any circumstances. 20
III. THE CONCEPT OF THE DEGREE AS PROPERTY
A. In re Marriage of Graham: The Property Anomaly
By holding that a professional degree is not marital property sub-
ject to division, the Nelson court espoused the view expressed by a
majority of jurisdictions, 2' most of which follow the reasoning of the
17. Id. at 1146 (citing In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa
1978); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 259, 337 N.W.2d 332, 334
(1983)). Other cases which recognize a property interest in the professional degree,
the minority position at the present time, include Reen v. Reen, 8 Fam. L. Rptr. 2193
(Mass. Probate & Fam. Ct. Hampden Div. Dec. 23, 1981); Daniels v. Daniels, 165
Mich. App. 726, 731, 418 N.W.2d 924, 927 (1988); Wilkins v. Wilkins, 149 Mich.
App. 779, 791, 386 N.W.2d 677, 682 (1986); Thomas v. Thomas, 131 Mich. App. 830,
831, 346 N.W.2d 595, 596, overruled on other grounds, 419 Mich. 942, 355 N.W.2d
617 (1984); Vaclav v. Vaclav, 96 Mich. App. 584, 592, 293 N.W.2d 613, 617 (1980);
McGowan v. McGowan, 142 A.D.2d 355, 357, 535 N.Y.S.2d 990, 991 (1988); O'Brien
v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 580-81, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715
(1985) (medical license is marital property); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 458, 459,
185 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1961) (medical license found analogous to a franchise and con-
stitutes property that court may consider in determining alimony award).
18. Nelson, 736 P.2d at 1147.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1146.
21. Jones v. Jones, 454 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 1984); Pyeatte v.
Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 351, 661 P.2d 196, 201 (Ct. App. 1982); Meinholz v.
Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 512, 678 S.W.2d 348, 349 (1984); In re Marriage of
Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (Ct. App.), overruled on
other grounds, In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr.
853 (1979); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978);
Wright v. Wrighl, 469 A.2d 803, 806 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983); Hughes v. Hughes, 438
So. 2d 146, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 II1. App.
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leading case, In re Marriage of Graham.22 Nelson cited with approval
the Graham court's rationale for refusing to classify a professional de-
gree as marital property:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encom-
passed even by the broad views of the concept of "property." It
does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value
on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on
death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned,
sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a
cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere
3d 234, 244, 470 N.E.2d 551, 559 (1984); In re Marriage of McManama, 386 N.E.2d
953, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980); In re
Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Iowa 1989); In re Marriage of Wagner, 435
N.W.2d 372, 375 (Iowa 1988); McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1983); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 358, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985); Drapek
v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 244, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949 (1987); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich.
App. 693, 695, 264 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1978); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755,
758 (Minn. 1981); Lowrey v. Lowrey, 633 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 361, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (1983); Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J.
510, 517, 453 A.2d 539, 542 (1982); Muckelroy v. Muckelroy, 84 N.M. 14, 15, 498
P.2d 1357, 1358 (1972); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 158, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935,
939 (1982); Geer v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 471, 478, 353 S.E.2d 427, 431 (1987); Nas-
trom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487, 493 (N.D. 1978); Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St.
3d 115, 117, 492 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1986); Adair v. Adair, 670 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1983); Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 566, 489 A.2d 782, 786
(1985); Heath v. Heath, 295 S.C. 312, 314, 368 S.E.2d 222, 223 (Ct. App. 1988);
Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264, 266 (S.D. 1984); Frausto v. Frausto, 611
S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1980); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696, 697
(Utah 1989); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 826 (Utah 1989); Hoak v. Hoak, 370
S.E.2d 473, 477 (W.Va. 1988); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 318
N.W.2d 918, 922 (1982); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984).
22. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). The following states have specifically
adopted the Graham language: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Utah, Wisconsin. See Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145, 1146-47 (Alaska 1987); Wis-
ner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 339-40, 631 P.2d 115, 121-22 (Ct. App. 1981); In re
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461 n.5, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 n.5 (Ct.
App.), overruled on other grounds, In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d
285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1979); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027, 423 N.E.2d 1201,
1203 (1981); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978); Inman
v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 648 S.W.2d 847 (1982)
(The Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the Graham language which had been re-
jected by the lower court.); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 351, 493 A.2d 1074, 1076
(1985); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 496, 453 A.2d 527, 531 (1982); Stevens v.
Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 117-18, 492 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1986); Hubbard v. Hub-
bard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979); Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa. 264, 268, 520 A.2d 15,
17 (1986); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 259 (S.D. 1984); Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Utah 1988); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d
1, 8, 318 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1982).
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expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that
may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our
view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of
that term. 23
Graham involved a six-year marriage during which the wife sup-
ported her husband in his pursuit of a master's degree in business ad-
ministration. As is common in such situations, the couple had
accumulated no marital assets, 24 so Anne Graham could not be com-
pensated by a property division as June Nelson was. The Colorado
court, noting that Anne Graham had not sought maintenance, said
that a trial court could consider one spouse's contribution to the edu-
cation of the other in awarding maintenance.2 5 As the dissent pointed
out, however, Colorado's statute restricted the court's power to award
maintenance in cases where the spouse seeking it is incapable of self-
support.26 The Graham court's refusal to recognize the professional
degree as property, combined with statutory inflexibility as to the
awarding of alimony, deprives the self-supporting contributing spouse
of any compensation - a clearly inequitable resolution in such a
situation. 27
B. Historical Perspective on the Law of Property
The view of property espoused by the Graham court represents
the once-dominant physicalist conception of property as articulated by
William Blackstone in the eighteenth century. 28 Blackstone based his
law of property on a taxonomy of things - things which could be
perceived by the senses, and rights issuing out of those things. 29
Blackstone's concept recognized as property only things over which
absolute dominion and control could be exercised.3 0 A central aspect
of this control was the alienability of property.
23. Graham, 194 Colo. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77, cited in Nelson, 736 P.2d at 1146-
47.
24. Id. at 4.31, 574 P.2d at 76.
25. Id. at 4.33, 574 P.2d at 78.
26. Id. at 4.35, 574 P.2d at 78-79 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
27. Recognizing the harshness of this potential result, the Colorado Supreme
Court subsequently ruled that, in cases where there is insufficient marital property to
divide, the maintenance statute's requirement of "reasonable need" must be inter-
preted broadly enough to encompass the working spouse's reasonable expectations
after years of deferring the acquisition of marital property and postponing her own
career goals in order to assist the other spouse through career training. In re Marriage
of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Colo. 1987).
28. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1765).
29. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development
of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 325, 331 (1980). This article
offers an excellent summary of the development of new property concepts.
30. Id. at 331.
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During the nineteenth century, as protection of intangible forms
of wealth became increasingly important to litigants, courts began to
define property in terms of the right to value, rather than the absolute
right to a given thing. Various forms of nonphysical property were
thus created, especially in equity jurisprudence, under which valuable
interests had to be designated as property in order to qualify for equi-
table protection. 31 Among the personal rights recognized as property
during this time was the goodwill of a business, which formerly had
been recognized only as an incident of real property. 32 By the end of
the century, property no longer denoted exclusively rights over things,
but rights to any valuable interest as well.3 3
Accordingly, a modem concept of property developed which de-
fines property as a set of legal relations between people with respect to
valuable interests. 34 This view was adopted by the Restatement of
Property in 1936. The Restatement definition begins: "The word
'property' is used in this Restatement to denote legal relations between
persons with respect to a thing. The thing may be an object having
physical existence or it may be any kind of an intangible such as a
patent right or a chose in action."'35 The Restatement then describes
the legal relations which constitute property in terms of four elements
(rights, privileges, powers and immunities), with their correlatives (ab-
sence of rights, duties, liabilities and disabilities). 36 The property
owner possesses a "bundle of rights,"' 37 and ownership does not de-
pend on having all of the available rights in the bundle, one of which is
alienability. The property is no less valuable if it happens to be
inalienable.38
This modern definition, which unlike Blackstone's is not self-lim-
iting, could theoretically embrace all valuable interests. In practice,
however, judicial selection of the interests which are to receive the
31. Id. at 334 (citing the rule in equity first stated in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst.
402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818)).
32. See id. at 335-36.
33. Among the other interests held to be property by courts during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries were the right to use news one has gathered,
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237-38 (1918), and the
right to a tax exemption on tribal land, Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 673 (1912).
34. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), for a perceptive and
thorough analysis of rights and status as the modem individual's wealth, or property.
35. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. I introductory note (1936) (emphasis
added).
36. Id. §§ 1-4.
37. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 158 (2d ed. 1988).
38. An example of property that cannot be transferred by the owner is an inalien-
able life estate of which the owner is life tenant. See 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1157 (2d ed. 1956).
1989]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:345
protection of the property laws is based on public policy considera-
tions. Public policy thus serves as the limiting principle that deter-
mines what valuable interests are denominated as property.
Community property and equitable distribution statutes reflect public
policy favoring recognition and protection of all valuable interests ac-
quired by spouses during marriage. The modern definition of property
permits recognition that, in many young families, a professional de-
gree or license, with its enhanced earning potential, is the major mari-
tal asset.39 A narrow view of marital property ignores the public
policy expressed by the social and legislative history of the equitable
dissolution statutes. 4° Ideally, the implications of the legislated policy
of equitable distribution should be as important to courts as precedent
in designating what is to constitute marital property.41
C. Alimony versus Property Award
Why have courts such as the Colorado Supreme Court in Graham
avoided the accepted concept of property, reverting instead to a nar-
row, anachronistic definition that ill accords with equitable distribu-
tion policy, in order to support their conclusion that the professional
degree is not marital property? The answer may lie partly in the con-
servative nature of the judiciary in general; claims that a professional
degree should be considered as marital property are relatively new,42
and, except for New York's Equitable Marriage Distribution Law, 43
no state statutes specify that professional degrees must be considered
39. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection
for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 411 (1980).
40. See generally I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON, FAMILY LAW, 291-300
(1986). See also Gailor & McGill, The Equitable Distribution of Professional Degrees
upon Divorce in North Carolina, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 69, 80 (1987).
41. The public policy that both parties to a marital dissolution are to receive an
equitable share of the assets accumulated during marriage underlies the property divi-
sion statutes of the 42 equitable distribution jurisdictions (including the District of
Columbia) and the nine community property states, which are Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.
42. The earliest claim found is Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P.2d 623 (Okla.), overruled,
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1977).
43. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1980-81). Under this statute, New
York courts have found that marital property encompasses not only professional de-
grees and licenses, but also the skills of an artisan, actor, professional athlete or any
person whose expertise has enabled him to become an exceptional wage earner. See
Golub v. Golub, 139 Misc. 2d 440, 444, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (in-
crease during marriage in value of wife's career as model and actress was marital
property, in view of husband's contributions to increase). See also McAlpine v. McAl-
pine, 143 Misc. 2d 30, 31-33, 539 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681-82 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (husband's
award of fellowship in Society of Actuaries was marital asset, but since wife had not
contributed to its attainment she could not share in any enhanced earning capacity).
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as marital property.44 Thus, courts can choose to interpret such stat-
utes narrowly to find that the legislature did not intend professional
degrees to be included as marital property subject to equitable
division. 45
The primary reason for these courts' conservatism, however, ap-
pears to be their unwillingness to undertake the valuation problems a
professional degree represents, especially to grapple with the issue of
future earning potential.4 6 Yet, recognizing the inequities in allowing
a contributing spouse who is capable of self-support to go totally with-
out compensation, courts in the Graham line have allowed the hus-
band's future earning potential to be considered in awarding alimony,
while still denying that the degree itself is a divisible marital asset.47
One appellate court has even held that the lower court's erroneous
award of a property settlement representing a valuation of the hus-
band's degree could be sustained if it were recharacterized as a provi-
sion for additional alimony.48 In these jurisdictions, alimony becomes
the back door by which the contributing spouse can be compensated
with some future earnings, without designating the degree or earning
potential as property.
44. Some statutes do require the courts to consider, in awarding maintenance or
property, "the contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earn-
ing power of the other." Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.26(9), 767.255(5) (West 1981).
Statutes with similar provisions include CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(1)(B)(2) (West
Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(c)(6) (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.075 (1)(d), (e) (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-5(a)(6) (1982); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(d) (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21(l)(e) (West 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23.1(h) (West Supp. 1989)
(award of alimony); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (1987); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 107.105(1)(d) (1983); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(b)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1989);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d)(9) (1984 & Supp. 1988). See Haugan v. Haugan,
117 Wis. 2d 200, 207-12, 343 N.W.2d 796, 804 (1984) (even though wife was not in
need, she could be awarded maintenance to compensate her for contribution to hus-
band's education). A few statutes do not mention the contribution of one spouse to
the education of the other, but do require consideration of a spouse's "interruption of
[a] personal career or educational opportunities." See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-
365 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23(b)(8) (West Supp. 1989) (equitable distribu-
tion of property).
45. See Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. Super. 151, 155-57, 486 A.2d 951, 952-54
(Super. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 513 Pa. 264, 520 A.2d 15 (1986).
46. See infra Section IV.A.
47. See Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985); Drapek v. Drapek,
399 Mass. 240, 244-47, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949-50 (1987); Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d
238, 240 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
48. Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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While this solution may appear on its face to be equitable, the use
of alimony rather than a property settlement has important disadvan-
tages for the contributing spouse.49 Alimony is taxable income which
is terminable upon the remarriage of the recipient or the death of
either party. Alimony is conventionally not paid in a lump sum but
over a period of years, posing the risks to the recipient of collection
problems and possible modification or termination by the court.50
Alimony awards interfere with the important goal of finality of litiga-
tion, causing unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources. The pro-
tracted nature of alimony payments also means that the recipient
cannot use the money as flexibly as she could a lump sum property
award, toward financing her own education or starting a business, for
example. Most importantly, alimony is not a matter of right; its pro-
priety and amount are discretionary with the court in all jurisdictions,
based by statutory mandate on the court's concept of need or necessity
in the particular case.5' The contributing spouse is thus completely at
the mercy of the court and her ex-spouse over a period of years.52
In contrast, a fair division of property is generally seen by courts
as equitably necessary, not discretionary.5 3 A property award is final
and not terminable on the recipient's death or remarriage.5 4 Such an
award does not constitute taxable income. Moreover, the award is
generally nonmodifiable, so that once the property settlement agree-
ment is reached the parties need not return to court.55
49. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 650
(2d ed. 1988).
50. Id. at 653.
51. Id. at 644. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (Supp. 1988), and text supra
at note 4. Given these disadvantages, the fact that alimony is not dischargeable if the
payor goes bankrupt seems small consolation to the contributing spouse.
52. Even though fault has largely been eliminated as a ground for divorce, some
courts still consider it a relevant factor in the alimony decision. See, e.g., Chapman v.
Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Ky. 1973) (fault is not to be considered in determin-
ing whether a spouse is entitled to maintenance, but it may be considered in determin-
ing the amount to be awarded); Mahne v. Mahne, 147 N.J. Super. 326, 329, 371 A.2d
314, 315, cert. denied, 75 N.J. 22, 379 A.2d 253 (1977); Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d
910, 916 (N.D. 1975). Some statutes also explicitly state that the court is to consider
fault (often expressed as "the conduct of the parties") in awarding alimony. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.08(l) (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1(b) (1982); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (Law. Co-op. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.335(2)(9) (West
Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1988); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 501(b)(14) (Purdon Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15(i) (1986).
53. Moore, Should a Professional Degree be Considered a Marital Asset Upon Di-
vorce?, 15 AKRON L. REV. 543, 551-52 (1982).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Gailor & McGill, supra note 40, at 82-86; Note, Horstmann v.
Horstmann: Present Right to Practice a Profession as Marital Property, 56 DENVER
L.J. 677, 681-84 (1979).
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The policy behind equitable distribution of marital assets is that
marriage is an economic partnership, and that the couple's invest-
ments in the marital property should be divided as fairly as possible.
Valuing the professional degree indirectly by means of an alimony
award may seem to achieve an equitable resolution for the contribut-
ing spouse in some situations, but it poses unacceptable risks and dis-
advantages for the recipient, unless certain of the traditional attributes
of alimony are altered. Both common judicial solutions to the prob-
lem - indirectly valuing the degree through alimony, or refusing to
value the degree at all - can severely disadvantage the contributing
spouse and thus frustrate the policy on which equitable distribution is
founded.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR BALANCING THE EQUITIES
A. Valuing the Degree Using a Labor Theory
The problem of how to assign a value to the professional degree
or license appears to be the primary concern of courts which, like the
Alaska Supreme Court, have denied the degree or license status as
marital property. At the root of this concern lies the perceived neces-
sity of finding a way to value the degree-holding spouse's future earn-
ing capacity in order to arrive at a full economic valuation of the
degree. It is a well-settled principle of economics that the present
value of an income-producing entity consists of its future earning ca-
pacity. 56 Valuing a future earning stream, however, while economi-
cally desirable, presents two serious problems in the marital
dissolution context.
The first problem is that prospective valuation is necessarily spec-
ulative. Although abundant statistics exist to provide data for the for-
mulas used to calculate future earning potential attributable to a
professional degree, 57 not all degree holders can earn the average sta-
tistical value; and it is not possible to consider fully all the variables
that can affect actual future value. Such variables include not only
56. Garfield, Wrongful Death: Principles Governing Valuation of Economic Law,
1967 INs. L.J. 654, 655.
57. A typical calculation is described in Fitzpatrick & Doucette, Can the Eco-
nomic Value of an Education Really Be Measured? A Guide for Marital Property Dis-
solution, 21 J. FAM. L. 511, 516-20 (1982). More generally, to determine future
earning potential, one must:
1. determine earning capacity after the education has been acquired, to be
compared with the earning capacity if the education has not been obtained;
2. subtract out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs - lost earnings - of
the added education, costs which would be incurred anyway;
3. discount future income to present value, selecting a discount rate which
factors in elements of risk such as premature death or disability.
Krauskopf, supra note 39, at 382-84.
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premature death or disability, but unforeseeable changes in market op-
portunities, or changes of career or profession.58 It is true that courts
have long engaged in just such speculation in allowing calculations of
future earning potential as damages in wrongful death and personal
injury actions, and several commentators cite this precedent as justifi-
cation for valuing the professional degree's future earning potential. 9
These advocates overlook the fact that in tort, it is the finding of fault
that justifies the imposition of damages. With the growing trend to-
ward no-fault divorce, this important policy justification is increas-
ingly inapplicable in marital dissolution law.
The second difficulty is that valuing of the degree in terms of sta-
tistically average future earnings could seriously infringe on the stu-
dent spouse's personal freedom to pursue his career as he wishes, or
even to change careers entirely. A graduate of a nationally ranked law
school has the option to work in a large law firm in a major city at a
high entering salary, yet he may wish to practice public interest law or
work for a government agency, or he may have captured a prestigious,
but low-paying judicial clerkship. If he chooses any of the less remu-
nerative positions, his earnings will be below the statistical average for
his profession. Must he be required to live in a different city, give up a
clerkship, or stay in a profession for which he may soon discover he is
unsuited, in order to realize the income level projected at the time of
the marital dissolution?
Any of these alternatives would represent an unsupportable en-
croachment on the personal freedom of a spouse who, at least in the
eyes of the law, if not in fact, has committed no fault. Placing such a
lien on the student spouse's future cannot be justified, even on the
grounds that only by so doing can the contributing spouse be fully
compensated. Some means of valuation must be employed that estab-
lishes a more just balance between these competing interests.
The valuation method that comes the closest to achieving this
balance is the labor theory of value, as proposed by Professor Linda
58. Mullenix, The Valuation of an Educational Degree at Divorce, 16 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 227, 268 (1983).
59. See Gailor & McGill, supra note 40, at 97; Moore, supra note 53, at 547;
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,
Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181, 1219 (1981); Krauskopf,
supra note 39, at 388-89; Case Comment, Divorce After Professional Schook Education
and Future Earning Potential May Be Marital Property: In re Marriage of Horst-
mann, 44 Mo. L. REV. 329, 333-36 (1979); Comment, Professional Education as a
Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, 64 IOWA L. REV. 705 (1979); Case Comment,
Graduate Degree Rejected as Marital Property Subject to Division upon Divorce: In re
Marriage of Graham, I1 CoNN. L. REV. 62, 71 (1978); Comment, The Interest of the
Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 590, 605-06 (1974).
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Mullenix. 60 This method is founded on the classic economic theory
that the value of any commodity can be expressed in terms of the labor
input required to produce it. The labor theory of value was dominant
before the advent of modem industrialized society brought to the fore
market-oriented theories of value, and it is still a valid means of assess-
ing the value of a nonmarketable asset that has been produced by the
application of a single factor of production.61
According to the labor theory, the measure of the value of the
degree as a marital asset is the amount of labor time it took the student
spouse to acquire it. Upon divorce, the student spouse owes the mar-
riage the value of this asset, or the time which was spent on its acquisi-
tion, rather than on contributions to the family that the student spouse
could have otherwise made. This value is determined by awarding the
contributing spouse fifty percent of the student spouse's actual post-
degree income for the same period of time it took him to acquire the
degree. Thus, the contributing spouse who supported the student
spouse during a three-year law degree is entitled to fifty percent of the
student spouse's income for the three years following the divorce. A
court employing this method never has to set an actual monetary
value on the degree, so that the need for often conflicting expert valua-
tions is avoided. 62
The labor theory of value allows the contributing spouse to be
compensated with an amount that exceeds mere restitution, because it
is the cost of the degree to the student spouse, and not the wife's con-
tributions, that is being valued. The contributing spouse is fully com-
pensated for her investment in labor expended, even if she does not
receive as much money as she would have if the degree were valued in
terms of future earnings. The period of payment is confined to the first
few years of the student spouse's professional career, when his earning
power reflects primarily the degree's value rather than the value of
experience and skill acquired over time. Moreover, limitation of the
period of payment to a few years minimizes the restrictions on the
student spouse's pursuit of his career that would be imposed by an
award of a portion of the student spouse's future earnings spanning
most if not all of his productive lifetime.
Valuing the degree in terms of labor also provides a means of
reimbursing the contributing spouse's opportunity costs without en-
gaging in speculation as to the monetary value of opportunities fore-
gone. The primary opportunity costs incurred by the contributing
60. Mullenix, supra note 58, at 274-83. See also Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d
200, 214-15, 343 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1984).
61. Mullenix, supra note 58, at 274-77.
62. Id. at 278-79.
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spouse are time spent and salary and educational opportunities sacri-
ficed. Receiving fifty percent of the degree-holding spouse's income
for the same period of time foregone by the contributing spouse allows
her the same kind of benefit she had provided - a sum of money large
enough to enable the pursuit of a full-time educational program, or to
fund other opportunities of her choice.
Upon declaring that a professional degree or license is marital
property subject to equitable distribution, the Alaska Supreme Court
should adopt the labor theory of valuation as the preferred method for
trial courts to use in valuing the degree or license. This method pro-
vides a fair return on the contributing spouse's monetary and opportu-
nity cost investment without placing untenable restrictions on the
student spouse's future, and, in addition, it is simple to calculate and
to implement. Trial courts should, however, maintain the discretion
to adjust the percent of the labor award downward from fifty percent if
the equities of the individual case, supported by adequate evidence,
require. An example of such a case would be one in which the student
spouse was declared ineligible for a scholarship, or was required to
borrow money from an outside source at a higher interest rate, be-
cause his wife was contributing to the family income.
B. Restitution in Quasi-Contract
If the Alaska Supreme Court chooses to remain among the major-
ity of jurisdictions that do not recognize the professional degree as
marital property, alternative means remain for balancing the equities
between the contributing spouse and student spouse. A court is not
restricted by the terms of the equitable distribution and maintenance
statutes, but may resort to its inherent power to grant equitable relief
by finding that a quasi-contract, or contract implied in law, existed
between the husband and wife.63 The court can thus apply principles
of restitution to prevent the unjust enrichment of the student spouse
independently of maintenance determinations and without having to
designate the degree as marital property.
To grant this remedy, the court must find that one party has re-
ceived a benefit at the expense of the other, and that it would be unjust
for the recipient to retain the benefit without compensating the other
party. As long as the conferring of the benefit was neither officious
nor gratuitous, its retention is considered unjust.64 The Restatement
63. See, e.g., Krauskopf, supra note 39, at 389-91.
64. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 500, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (1982)
("Where a partner to marriage takes the benefits of his spouse's support in obtaining a
professional degree or license with the understanding that future benefits will accrue
and inure to both of them, and the marriage is then terminated without the supported
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of Restitution recognizes that a benefit is unjustly retained when serv-
ices are performed with the recipient's knowledge because the per-
former reasonably believes that he will also benefit from the services.
65
A number of courts have applied the principle of unjust enrich-
ment in the context of marital investment in the education of a
spouse,66 but a few courts have refused to do so, acting on the pre-
sumption that services performed within the marital relationship are
gratuitous.67 This presumption derives from the traditional common
law marital contract, whereby certain mutually beneficial services
were to be performed gratuitously by the husband and wife. The com-
mon law contract, however, never imposed on either spouse, especially
the wife,68 the duty of supporting the other during the acquisition of
an education. Since by so doing the contributing spouse has per-
formed a service and rendered a benefit not encompassed by the tradi-
tional contract, and for which the contract provides no offsetting
benefit, she should not be presumed to have provided this service gra-
tuitously. 69 Instead, the court should look to the contributing spouse's
reasonable expectations of the benefit she would in turn receive for
performing the service.70 Although the contributing spouse cannot
share in the eventual earnings realized from the degree, as she had
spouse giving anything in return, an unfairness has occurred that calls for a
remedy.").
65. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 40(b) (1937).
66. See Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1982); Wood-
worth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983); DeLa Rosa v.
DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); In re Marriage of Cropp, 5 Fam. L. Rptr.
(BNA) 2957 (D. Minn. 1979); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527
(1982); Adair v. Adair, 670 P.2d 1002 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983). See also Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 749-52 (Okla. 1979) (Oklahoma Supreme Court creates hy-
brid form of alimony called "cash award in lieu of property settlement," limited to
cases where only major marital asset is educational degree).
67. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981),
limited to facts of case, Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 354, 661 P.2d 196, 202 (Ct.
App. 1982); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 158-59, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939
(1982).
68. See Church v. Church, 96 N.M. 388, 395-96, 630 P.2d 1243, 1250-57 (Ct.
App. 1981) (wife's claims of providing financial support and educational funds for
husband's medical education state a basis for relief because wife had no duty to sup-
port (applying Virginia law)).
69. See Krauskopf, supra note 39, at 394. See also Woodworth v. Woodworth,
126 Mich. App. 258, 268, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983) ("Clearly... the degree was a
family investment, rather than a gift or benefit to the degree holder alone. Treating
the degree as such a gift would unjustly enrich the degree holder to the extent that the
degree's value exceeds its cost.").
70. DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981) (court awarded
extra-statutory equitable remedy on basis that wife had a "reasonable expectation"
that she would be rewarded for her efforts in putting husband through medical school
by a higher standard of living when he began practicing medicine).
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anticipated, she can at least be restored financially to the position she
would have been in if she had not made possible the earning of the
degree. 71
Unlike valuing future earning capacity, the remedy in restitution
is retrospective rather than prospective. The objective is to compen-
sate the contributing spouse by restoring to her the quantified present
value of her contributions, rather than to grant her a share of the stu-
dent spouse's income not yet earned. 72 The restitution remedy does
not involve the kind of speculation inherent in valuing future earnings;
it is based on actual past expenditures, concerning which the contrib-
uting spouse has the burden of proof. Courts vary as to their defini-
tion of what constitutes compensable educational costs. Some limit
71. The traditional common law marital contract appears to be undergoing redefi-
nition as societal changes are creating new obligations and expectations in marital and
even non-marital relationships. For example, there is growing judicial recognition of
individual contracts by which the parties order their own relationships in alternative
ways. Many jurisdictions, including Alaska, are holding valid antenuptial and marital
contracts which provide for distribution of property in the event of divorce. See
Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1048-51 (Alaska 1987) (discussing the changes in
social perception of marriage and divorce, and its effects on the law's recognition of
prenuptial agreements). Formerly, courts tended to find antenuptial contracts invalid
as against the public policy of discouraging divorce, and such contracts are still
deemed to violate public policy when their terms threaten to "promote and encourage
dissolution." In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 358, 551 P.2d 323, 333, 131
Cal. Rptr. 3, 13 (1976). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190(2)
(1981). Now, however, antenuptial contracts are more often viewed as realistic at-
tempts to provide for a possible contingency in a manner that tends to conserve both
marital and judicial resources. See, e.g., Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d at 358, 551 P.2d at 333-
34, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 13-14.
A growing number of courts are also making both contract and equitable reme-
dies available to unmarried couples ending their relationships. Not only do the courts
in several states recognize express contracts between such partners, but a number of
jurisdictions will look for an implied contract as did the California Supreme Court in
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (court
granted division of property accumulated in a non-marital relationship by finding an
oral implied-in-fact agreement). See, e.g., Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922 (Mo.
1987); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979) (implied contracts
of cohabiting couples recognized); Moroni v. Moroni, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 429 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1980), modified on other grounds, 85 A.D.2d 768, 445 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1981);
Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976) (recognizing express contracts
between cohabiting partners); Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303
(1987). If unmarried couples are accorded the benefit of these remedies, it would seem
only just to treat married couples in the same manner.
72. But see In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1989). The Iowa
Supreme Court affirmed an alimony award, styled as "reimbursement," that was cal-
culated on the basis of the husband's future earning potential. The court said, "In
keeping with the standard established in Horstmann, . . . courts in Iowa are not con-
fined to reimbursing supporting spouses solely for the expense of the advanced degree
itself." Id. at 66.
NELSON V NELSON
recovery to direct educational costs,73 some include living expenses, 74
and others recognize any other related contributions. 75 Whatever
costs are considered compensable, the amount awarded should include
adjustment for inflation and reasonable interest, so that the award is
restitutionary and not merely reimbursement.7
6
In addition, restitution avoids placing undue limitations on the
freedom of the degree-holding spouse to pursue his desired career
path. Although he must pay the restitutionary award out of his earn-
ings, the schedule of payments can be fixed at a level his income will
accommodate, in the manner of conventional loan payments. The stu-
dent spouse is, in fact, repaying an implied loan from the contributing
spouse. Moreover, as in a loan, the payments will eventually termi-
nate when the full amount of the award has been paid.
C. Restitution Through In Gross Maintenance
The majority of courts confronted with the problem of a profes-
sional degree in marital dissolution have declared that a professional
degree or license is not a marital asset, but that a spouse's contribu-
tions to its achievement by the other spouse may be considered in the
determination of alimony or maintenance, as well as in property divi-
sion if there is any property to divide. 77 For a number of reasons,
73. DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 389 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981).
74. Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 357, 661 P.2d 196, 207 (Ct. App. 1982).
75. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978) (Although
the Iowa Supreme Court held that the potential for increase in future earning capacity
made possible by the husband's law degree was a marital asset available for distribu-
tion, the award to the wife approved by the court was purely restitutionary in nature.);
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 501, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (1982); Lehmicke v.
Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 567-68, 489 A.2d 782, 786-87 (1985).
76. If the student spouse had had to secure this money from an outside source in
the form of a loan, he would have to repay both principal and interest; equity requires
that the contributing spouse be repaid in the same manner. See Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 1981). But see DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755
(Minn. 1981) (wife got money ten years later, with no adjustment for time lapse); Geer
v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987); Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa.
Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985).
77. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 340-41, 631 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Ct. App.
1981); In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 680 (Colo. 1987); In re Marriage of
McManama, 272 Ind. 483, 486, 399 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1980); In re Marriage of Fran-
cis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 1989); In re Marriage of Wagner, 435 N.W.2d 372, 375-
76 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); Wilkins v. Wilkins, 149 Mich. App. 779, 788-92, 386
N.W.2d 677, 681-83 (1986); Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 410, 354 N.W.2d 359,
361 (1984); In re Marriage of Cropp, 5 Fam. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2957 (D. Minn. 1979);
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N. J. Super. 598, 615, 442 A.2d 1062, 1071-72, rev'd on
other grounds, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d
487, 493 (N.D. 1978); Adair v. Adair, 670 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983);
Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 178-82, 677 P.2d 152, 157-59 (1984);
Lambert v. Lambert, 376 S.E.2d 331, 332-33 (W. Va. 1988); Haugan v. Haugan, 117
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however, conventional alimony is an unsatisfactory means of compen-
sating the contributing spouse.78 If the Alaska courts wish to employ
this remedy, several characteristics of conventional alimony must be
altered to provide the contributing spouse the benefits she would have
if there were property to divide.
Any maintenance award which functions as restitution to a con-
tributing spouse should be a lump sum, or in gross, award. This
award may be made payable in installments, but should be made
nonterminable upon remarriage. 79 By holding that contributions to
the welfare of a spouse may be considered in determining mainte-
nance, courts have recognized that the obligation to make the contrib-
uting spouse whole is a function of alimony as valid as the more
traditional function of providing support.8 0 Once this compensatory
function is acknowledged, the necessity of making the alimony award
nonterminable is apparent.8 1 Making the award in gross allows the
kind of finality present in a property settlement; although the award is
of necessity usually made payable in installments, it is not open-ended
like conventional alimony and the payments generally terminate
within a shorter period of time.
Nothing in Alaska's statute appears to prevent the adoption of in
gross maintenance in Alaska.8 2 The Alaska Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the statute also indicates a flexible approach toward the
Wis. 2d 200, 207-21, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800-06 (1984); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107
Wis. 2d 1, 10-12, 318 N.W.2d 918, 922-23 (1982).
78. See supra Section III.C.
79. See In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 1989). Courts which
have employed such a remedy include Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 198-99, 510
P.2d 905, 906-07 (1973); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 694-95, 264 N.W.2d 97,
98-99 (1978); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751-52 (Okla. 1979); Diment v.
Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); Washburn v. Washburn, 101
Wash. 2d 168, 183, 677 P.2d 152, 160 (1984); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis.
2d 1, 14-15, 318 N.W.2d 918, 924 (1982).
80. See In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 318 N.W.2d 918, 923
(1982) ("[M]aintenance payments are no longer limited to situations where the spouse
is incapable of self-support. Instead, we view maintenance as a flexible tool ... to
ensure a fair and equitable determination in each individual case."). See also Greer v.
Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 199, 510 P.2d 905, 907 (1973) ("Although referred to as
'alimony,' the lump sum awarded in the present case ... must be considered as a
substitute for, or in lieu of, the wife's rights in the husband's property as distinguished
from her rights of future support envisioned by the ordinary award of alimony.").
81. Krauskopf, supra note 39, at 406.
82. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (Supp. 1988). "In a judgment in an action for
divorce... the court may provide... (3) for the recovery by one party from the other
of an amount of money for maintenance, in gross or in installments, as may be just and
necessary without regard to which of the parties is in fault .... ." (emphasis added).
See also Faro v. Faro, 579 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Alaska 1978) (trial court is vested with
broad discretion in making alimony determination).
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granting of maintenance that would support such an award. In Nel-
son, the supreme court restated its longstanding preference for secur-
ing the financial needs of divorcing spouses by means of property
division rather than alimony.83 The court stated, however, that where
there is no substantial property to divide, alimony may be awarded if it
is found "just and necessary." '84 The supreme court has supported a
broad reading of the statute, stating that the spouse seeking mainte-
nance is not necessarily ineligible for maintenance because she can
support herself; she may be eligible if she is "unable to secure employ-
ment appropriate to her skills and interests."' 85 The concept of "ap-
propriate employment," rather than any kind of employment for the
contributing spouse, reflects an interpretation of the statutory require-
ment of necessity that is broad enough to permit rehabilitative alimony
for the education of a supporting spouse,86 and to allow a contributing
spouse to receive alimony even if she is self-supporting.87
The court thus appears to regard the requirement of necessity as
one of reasonable necessity in the light of the applicant's situation and
reasonable expectations. Given its progressive concept of the function
of alimony, it seems likely that the supreme court would uphold an
award of in gross nonterminable maintenance in a situation of the type
reserved in Nelson.
V. CONCLUSION
The time will come when an Alaska court will be confronted with
a marital dissolution in which one spouse, during a short-term mar-
riage with no significant assets, made possible the acquisition of a pro-
fessional degree by the other spouse. The Alaska Supreme Court,
which in Nelson v. Nelson refused to recognize a professional degree as
marital property, has not provided the lower courts with guidance as
to how to carry out the policy behind Alaska's equitable distribution
statute in such a situation.
Without acknowledging that the degree is property and, thus,
without disturbing Nelson, a trial court can provide restitutionary
83. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Alaska 1987). See also Bussell v. Bussell, 623
P.2d 1221, 1224 (Alaska 1981); Malone v. Malone, 587 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Alaska
1978); Messina v. Messina, 583 P.2d 804, 805 (Alaska 1978).
84. Nelson, 736 P.2d at 1147 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (3)).
85. Messina v. Messina, 583 P.2d 804, 805 (Alaska 1978) (citing UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 347 (1973)).
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compensation for the contributing spouse by either of two means: em-
ploying a theory of unjust enrichment in quasi-contract, or granting a
lump-sum maintenance award that is nonterminable and nonmodifi-
able. Ultimately, however, the supreme court should acknowledge
that a professional degree is the kind of valuable interest encompassed
by the modern concept of property. Such recognition need not lead
inevitably to a speculative valuation based on the degree-holding
spouse's future earning potential, nor should it be prevented by the
fact that the degree itself is not alienable. By adopting the nonspecula-
tive labor theory of value, the court can avoid valuing the degree in
monetary terms entirely. The labor theory, which values the degree
according to the time invested by the contributing spouse toward its
achievement by the student spouse, compensates the contributing
spouse in the fairest manner possible without unduly restricting the
future freedom of the student spouse.
Celia Grasty Jones
